SAM Rainsyសហស្ថាបនិកគណបក្សសង្គ្រោះជាតិ

ការពឹងផ្អែកយ៉ាងខ្លាំងរបស់កម្ពុជា ទៅលើចិន បើកដៃឲ្យទីក្រុងប៉េកាំង ជៀសវាងការបង់ពន្ធ លើទំនិញនាំចូលទៅសហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក / Cambodia's deep dependence on China lets Beijing bypass tariffs

ចែករំលែក ៖​

១៧ ឧសភា ២០២៥ / 17 May 2025

ការពឹងផ្អែកយ៉ាងខ្លាំងរបស់កម្ពុជា ទៅលើចិន បើកដៃឲ្យទីក្រុងប៉េកាំង ជៀសវាងការបង់ពន្ធ លើទំនិញនាំចូលទៅសហរដ្ឋអាមេរិក។

ហ៊ុន សែន ចាប់យកប្រជារាស្ត្រខ្មែរ ធ្វើជាចំណាប់ខ្មាំង ឲ្យរងគ្រោះជំនួសគាត់ ដើម្បីឲ្យត្រកូលគាត់ បានបន្តកាន់អំណាចក្បត់ជាតិ ដោយមិនខ្វល់ពីទុក្ខវេទនារបស់ប្រជារាស្ត្រ។

https://asia.nikkei.com/.../Cambodia-s-deep-dependence-on...

Nikkei Asia

May 17, 2025

CAMBODIA'S DEEP DEPENDENCE ON CHINA LETS BEIJING BYPASS TARIFFS

By Sam Rainsy

In 2024, China accounted for 49.1% of Cambodia's total imports, according to the General Department of Customs and Excise (GDCE). That amounted to $3.7 billion, marking a 30.9% year-on-year increase. The vast majority of these imports were raw materials, machinery and semi-finished goods critical to Cambodia's export-oriented manufacturing sector -- particularly textiles and apparel.

However, Cambodia's exports to China remained minimal, at only 5% of its total outbound trade. The overwhelming majority of Cambodian exports -- especially garments, footwear and travel goods -- were instead destined for Western markets, with the United States absorbing 35% of total Cambodian exports. This asymmetric trade profile suggests that Chinese components are increasingly processed or assembled in Cambodia, then exported onward to the U.S. under Cambodian origin.

This triangular trade dynamic reached a breaking point in 2024 when the U.S. recorded a $12.3 billion trade deficit with Cambodia, having imported $12.7 billion worth of goods while exporting very little in return. This imbalance prompted the U.S. to impose a 49% tariff on imports from Cambodia earlier this year, under the rationale that the trade structure was distorted and unsustainable.

But Cambodia's bilateral trade imbalance with the U.S. does not exist in a vacuum. It is inextricably linked to the opposite imbalance in Cambodia's trade with China. The U.S. imports finished goods from Cambodia -- especially garments -- while Cambodia imports nearly all the inputs for those goods from China. In effect, China is exporting to the U.S. via Cambodia, and this indirect path has allowed Beijing to cushion the impact of direct American tariffs on Chinese products.

A closer examination of bilateral trade figures reveals a noticeable discrepancy between Cambodian and U.S. sources. According to Cambodia's GDCE, the country exported $9.7 billion worth of goods to the U.S. in 2024. However, according to official U.S. trade data, the U.S. imported $12.7 billion from Cambodia during the same year -- resulting in a gap of $3 billion, or over 30%. While some of this difference can be explained by statistical factors such as valuation methods, shipping lags or transshipment through third countries, the scale of the gap suggests something more.

Trade analysts have long suspected that fraudulent certificates of origin may be used to disguise Chinese exports as Cambodian in origin -- allowing them to benefit from Cambodia's preferential access to U.S. markets. This practice was formally documented in 2019, when U.S. Customs and Border Protection sanctioned several Cambodian exporters for mislabeling Chinese steel and aluminum products to avoid tariffs. Although Cambodian authorities pledged to tighten enforcement, such practices remain a concern, particularly when tariff differentials create strong incentives for circumvention. These discrepancies reinforce the perception that China may be using Cambodia not only as a manufacturing platform but also as a regulatory shield in its ongoing trade dispute with the United States.

Cambodia's knitted fabric and cotton imports come from China, and Chinese materials account for roughly 45% of the inputs used in Cambodian factories. Yet once processed, the majority of these goods are rebranded as Cambodian exports -- with over 85% of Cambodia's U.S.-bound exports consisting of garments and footwear.

Chinese companies have capitalized on Cambodia's preferential trade access to Western markets, relocating portions of their supply chains to Cambodian Special Economic Zones where labor is cheaper and regulatory scrutiny is less intense. In turn, Cambodia has experienced a surge in Chinese foreign direct investment, particularly in garment-related manufacturing and logistics infrastructure, such as the planned, though temporarily frozen, Funan Techo Canal, backed initially by $1.7 billion in Chinese financing.

In this context, the metaphor of an "economic aircraft carrier" becomes apt. Just as a naval carrier projects power beyond a country's immediate borders, Cambodia is now projecting Chinese trade power into American markets. Its geographic position, logistical capacity, and regulatory environment make it an ideal launchpad for exports, particularly as China seeks to neutralize U.S. tariffs without triggering further confrontation.

But this model is not without risks. Cambodia's economic structure is now marked by dual dependency: on China for inputs, capital and industrial support, and on the U.S. Any deterioration in relations with either partner could send shockwaves through the Cambodian economy. The 49% U.S. tariff illustrates how this delicate balancing act can backfire -- jeopardizing not only Cambodia's exports but also China's broader strategy of supply chain rerouting.

This evolving trade architecture also exposes a deep inconsistency in Cambodia's geopolitical strategy, especially under the enduring influence of Hun Sen, who, after nearly 40 years as prime minister, formally handed power to his son Hun Manet in 2023. Despite the nominal transition, Hun Sen remains the country's de facto strongman, continuing to pull the strings as president of the Senate and president of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP). Under his continued direction, Cambodia finds itself economically dependent on the U.S. -- its largest export market -- while being politically and financially reliant on China. Beijing has provided the regime with unconditional support, from infrastructure financing to diplomatic backing, shielding it from Western criticism over human rights and democratic backsliding.

But this dual dependency is growing increasingly untenable. The U.S.'s imposition of a 49% tariff on Cambodian goods highlights the real-world limits of an economic model based on exporting to a market that is simultaneously being antagonized in the political sphere. At the same time, the regime cannot afford to alienate China, which it views as a guarantor of its political survival. This contradiction underscores the fragility of Cambodia's current strategic posture, as it risks being caught in the crossfire of great power rivalry while clinging to an outdated balancing act shaped by domestic authoritarian imperatives.

Cambodia's transformation into both a military and economic outpost for China offers a sobering illustration of how great power competition now shapes the trajectories of smaller economies. The triangular trade relationship between China, Cambodia and the U.S. reveals how deeply entangled economic networks have become in geopolitical strategies.

For the U.S., the tariff on Cambodian goods may serve as a warning shot against supply chain manipulation and trade triangulation. For China, the setback highlights the limits of its proxy strategy in an era of heightened scrutiny and retaliatory trade measures. And for Cambodia, the episode signals the dangers of overreliance on one partner for production and another for consumption.

As global trade becomes more politicized, countries like Cambodia will face growing pressure to choose sides -- or risk paying the price for being caught in the middle.

Sam Rainsy